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UNITED STATES V. BLY: A UNIVERSITY QUALIFIES AS A 
"PERSON" UNDER THE EXTORTION ELEMENT OF 18 
U.S.C. § 876(B) AND STATEMENTS MADE PRIVATELY TO 
SPECIFIC INDIVIDUALS, THAT ARE ONLY 
GRAMMATICALLY CONDITIONAL AND PROMISE 
VIOLENT RETRIBUTION, ARE NOT PROTECTED UNDER 
THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
By: Patricia Calomeris 
In a matter of first impression, the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit held that under the extortion element of 18 
U.S.C. § 876(b) ("§ 876(b)"), "person" is not limited to a living and 
breathing person. United States v. Bly, 510 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2007). 
Furthermore, the Court held that unconditional statements directed 
privately at specific individuals, promising violent retribution, were 
not protected under the First Amendment as "political hyperbole." 
Bly, 510 F.3d. at 458-59. 
In 2002, Charles A. Bly ("Bly") was dropped from his doctorate 
program at the University of Virginia ("UV A") because he failed to 
complete his dissertation. From 2003 through 2004, Bly sent 
threatening messages to various people associated with the doctorate 
program and UV A, demanding removal of his thesis advisor's website, 
as well as civil and monetary damages. The last letter ("the letter") 
from Bly, dated January 1, 2004, addressed forty-six individuals and 
was the source of the convictions giving rise to this issue. The letter 
stated that with bullets he could end the dispute with a "twitch of his 
index finger" and that "it would be a shame to brutalize" his thesis 
advisors in order to guarantee that he received a hearing. 
Consequently, on February 4, 2004, Bly was indicted by a federal 
grand jury on five counts, including an offense under § 876(b), 
alleging that Bly had sent the letter "knowingly, and with intent to 
extort from the University of Virginia a sum of money or other thing 
of value ... containing a threat to injure." In March 2004, Bly filed a 
motion to dismiss the five counts, arguing that his statements were 
protected under the First Amendment and that UV A is not a "person" 
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subject to extortion. The United States District Court for the Western 
District of Virginia denied Bly's motion and later held that his 
statements were true threats and that UV A was a "person" subject to 
extortion. On October 13, 2005, Bly entered into a conditional plea 
agreement with the United States Attorney, in which he reserved his 
right under Rule II(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 
to appeal the denial of his dismissal motions. In 2006, Bly pled guilty 
to the § 876(b) offense and the other counts against him were 
dismissed. Shortly after Bly's conviction, he filed a notice of appeal 
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which 
had jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.c. § 1291. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed 
the district court's ruling and held that Bly's statements qualified as 
true threats which were not protected as "political hyperbole," and that 
the term "person," as used in the extortion statute, need not be a living 
person. Bly, 510 F.3d at 458-61. The Court explained that, in order to 
prove the extortion element of § 876(b) offenses, the prosecution must 
establish that the defendant caused the mailing of written 
communication, which contained a threat, and that the communication 
was intended to extort something of value. Bly, 510 F.3d at 458. Bly 
first argued that his statements were political hyperbole and that the 
prosecution failed to prove the "threat element" to sustain an extortion 
conviction. Id. In rejecting this argument, the Court determined that 
not all verbal or written utterances are protected under the First 
Amendment and that threats of violence fall outside of the First 
Amendment protection. Bly, 510 F.3d at 458. 
Furthermore, the Court found that Bly wrongfully relied on Watts v. 
United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969), to argue that his statements were 
political hyperbole and not true threats. Bly, 510 F.3d at 458-59. In 
Watts, the defendant was a Vietnam War protestor and stated "[i]fthey 
ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my sights is 
L.BJ. [President Lyndon Baines Johnson]." Bly, 510 F.3d at 459 
(quoting Watts, 394 U.S. at 706). The United States Supreme'· Court 
held that Watts' statements were political hyperbole and not true 
threats because they were conditional, spoken to a large group about a 
matter of "great national concern," and were accepted with laughter 
rather than fear. Bly, 510 FJd at 459 (citing Watts, 394 U.S. at 707-
08). 
The Court also looked to United States v. Lockhart, which held that 
Lockhart's threats against President Bush qualified as true threats. Bly, 
510 F.3d at 459 (citing Lockhart, 382 F.3d 447 (4th Cir. 2004)). The 
2008] State Universities are Entities Subject to Extortion 197 
Court held that Lockhart's statements were only grammatically and not 
expressly conditional, the statements were made privately, and they 
did not appear to be a joke. Bly, 510 F.3d at 459. 
In light of these cases, the Court held that Bly's statements were 
more similar to those in Lockhart because they were only 
grammatically conditional. Bly, 510 F.3d at 459. Furthermore, unlike 
the statements in Watts, Bly's communications were private and were 
delivered to specific individuals. Bly, 510 F.3d at 459. As a result, the 
Court held that Bly's statements were not protected under the First 
Amendment' as political hyperbole. Bly, 510 F.3d at 458. 
Next, the Court addressed Bly's contention that the state did not 
prove the extortion element because UV A was not a "person" subject 
to extortion. Id. at 460. This issue was a matter of first impression for 
the Fourth Circuit. Id. Bly argued that UVA was not a "person" 
subject to extortion because it was not a living, breathing human 
being. Id. The Court rejected Bly's contention. Id. 
The Court analyzed whether the term "person" as used in § 876(b) 
is ambiguous. Bly, 510 F .3d at 460. The term "person" is used three 
times in § 876(b): once in the broad sense of "any person," and twice 
in the threat element of the extortion conviction. Bly, 510 F.3d at 460-
61. The' Court reasoned that, while typically only living people can be 
threatened by kidnapping, it was reasonable to conclude that "artificial 
entities" such as UV A could be victims of extortion demands. Id. at 
461. Additionally, the Court determined that "person" can be defined 
as a human being, a corporation, or other legal entities. Id. Therefore, 
the Court held that the term "person" as used in §876(b) is not limited 
to a living and breathing human being. Bly, 510 F.3d at 461. 
The Court also rejected Bly's argument that UV A could not qualify 
as a "person" because it is an extension of the Commonwealth of 
Virginia. !d. at 462. Bly's contention relied on the Dictionary Act, 1 
U.S.C. § 1, which states that "person" can be defined as entities such 
as corporations, but the definition omits governmental entities. Bly, 
510 F .3d at 462. The Court, however, held that under Virginia law, 
UV A was a corporation and a department of the government. Id. 
Furthermore, the issue of whether a government entity qualifies as a 
person was not as relevant in criminal cases. Id. at 463. The Court 
stated that such a question was more relevant to civil disputes "such as 
when a litigant seeks damages from a state entity." Id. Therefore, the 
Court held that this argument was not relevant or pertinent to the 
instant case. Id. 
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Bly expands the scope of entities that can be subject to extortion 
threats, and in so doing, extends protection to public universities. In 
light of the tragedies at Virginia Tech in 2007 and Northern Illinois 
University in 2008, it is apparent that state entities are subject to 
danger and violence, and thus are deserving of this extra protection. 
The Court's strong stance sends a message that it will not allow 
extortionists to escape the penalties of their actions based on mere 
semantics and grammatical conditionality. 
